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TASHI TSERING, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
A TIBETAN PERSPECTIVE ON
 DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION
INTRODUCTION
November 30, 1999 marked a turning point in global history. Tens of thousands of ordinary 
people took to the streets of Seattle to stop the second 
round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Ministerial Conference. This event made one thing 
clear—people representing various groups of the 
globalized are increasingly critical of the management 
and effects of globalization. This incident was also an 
historic event for Tibetans—when they took part in 
the demonstrations, it marked the ﬁrst time they had 
joined a global revolt against globalization. 
Why would Tibetans, economically one of the 
poorest and least affected peoples of the world, op-
pose this global phenomenon? There has been very 
little attempt to explore this issue; apart from a few 
brieﬁng papers, Tibet has not been looked at in the 
context of globalization.1 This paper attempts to con-
tribute to the scant literature by providing a Tibetan 
perspective on this complex and relevant subject. The 
purpose of this paper is a simple one: to articulate 
what globalization (and thus development) means to 
Tibetans by explicating its implications for Tibet. In 
order to achieve this task substantively, it is essential 
to see it in a matrix of at least three contexts, which 
are presented in three separate sections. Section I 
provides a brief discussion of the meaning and na-
ture of the phenomenon of globalization. Section II 
presents China’s logic in transitioning to a “market 
economy” and the objectives of “developing” Tibet. 
Section III explicates the effects of free trade rules 
and China’s WTO agreements on Tibet. The paper 
concludes with certain policy recommendations and 
suggestions for further research. 
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The Chinese word 
for Tibet, Xizang, 
means the “western 
treasure house.” 
…the trends in re-
cent decades show 
that the Chinese 
government may 
now be success-
ful in what it has 
always wanted to 
do—to put Tibet on 
the escalator to be-
coming a proﬁtable 
resource colony. 
“
”
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SECTION I: GLOBALIZATION
Meaning and deﬁnition:
Globalization is seen differently by different people. It is 
commonly understood as a phenomenon of intensiﬁcation 
of international trade due to improvements in technology 
and ﬁnancial systems, and the resulting expansion of 
markets—economic globalization. However, the experience 
from the last few decades of intensiﬁed globalization makes 
it clear that the forces driving globalization, its impacts, 
and its implications reach far beyond economics.2  Canada’s 
implementation of two international environmental 
agreements, for example, has been successfully challenged 
under NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 
Chapter 11 by U.S. companies, and Canada will soon be 
ordered to pay damages to U.S. investors in both cases. 
Globalization as a process of trade and commerce, the 
spread of cultural inﬂuences, and dissemination of knowl-
edge and understanding between nations and peoples is an 
ancient phenomenon. The perception of, and the debate over 
globalization, however, is a recent phenomenon; it is only in 
recent decades that world trade has expanded so widely and 
intensively, and has become so structurally interdependent 
that the use of word “global,” as distinct from “international” 
has become justiﬁed.3 Therefore, for analytic purposes of this 
paper, we shall refer to globalization as the post World War II 
wave of intensiﬁed world trade led by the free trade doctrine. 
This analytic deﬁnition is suitable for our purposes because, 
as we shall see, it is the rules of this new wave of globaliza-
tion that will impact the Tibetan people as a consequence of 
China’s WTO accession.
One of the deﬁning aspects of globalization in the recent 
decades is the spread of neoliberal policies, also called neo-
orthodox policies, guided by free trade doctrine.4 Following 
the footsteps of powerful Western economies like the US 
and England, governments around the globe are adopting 
policies that emphasize deregulation and privatization, and a 
minimum role of government in the market. Another deﬁn-
ing feature of this wave of globalization is the institutional 
involvement in the free trade regime. The role of interna-
tional institutions like the WTO, IMF (International Mon-
etary Fund), and the World Bank and their centralized global 
trade bureaucracy has become very signiﬁcant in managing 
the world economy.5 For example, as of January 1, 2002, 144 
economies, including all the major military and economic 
powers of the world, have joined the WTO, agreeing to con-
form to the rules of the free trade regime.6 Presumably, these 
institutions facilitate a “level playing ﬁeld” for countries, or 
businesses to trade under a single set of rules. But what it 
means for small Tibetan businesses is that they will have to 
compete with Chinese and powerful Western corporations 
in a “free market” environment.
Backlash of globalization for Tibetan society
Globalization, then, is a result of a renewed global faith 
in certain mercantilistic theories of such early British free 
trade advocates as Cobden, Ricardo and Adam Smith. What 
is frightening, and laughable at the same time, is the fact 
that these economic theories are taken to be infallible, 
ignoring their long list of assumptions, among these that 
their application will result in proﬁt for all parties. For 
example, based on the theory of comparative advantage, 
international trade is supposed to be a mutually beneﬁcial 
transaction between countries. In its simplest form, the logic 
of this theory dictates that a country should buy low and 
sell high regardless of a product’s importance to the local 
culture and economy.7 Thus, applying this theory to Tibet, 
if barley (the staple food crop of Tibetans for centuries) 
can be imported at less expense than the cost of domestic 
production, Tibet should stop domestic barley production, 
buy barley from wherever, and sell products that it can 
produce more economically than others, i.e., focus on the 
production and sale of raw materials like timber, wool, oil, 
minerals, etc. This way, it is theorized, all parties can proﬁt 
from trade. It is interesting to note, however, that the world 
has chosen to ignore certain other economic theories that 
appeared at the same time. For example, the Iron Law of 
Wages by David Ricardo8, the very person credited to have 
developed the theory of comparative advantage, states that 
the natural price of labor will be the amount that permits 
bare subsistence plus enough to reproduce. No wonder 
labor groups were amongst the most vocal demonstrators in 
Seattle. Free trade, as critics argue, has today become a carte 
blanche for multinational corporations to exploit cheap labor 
wherever they can ﬁnd it. 
In the view of this paper (and beyond), the more important 
aspect of globalization is the utter absence of moral ideals 
about social justice and environmental stewardship in its 
guiding principles. Not only do the Tibetan people have every 
reason to be concerned about the various negative impacts 
of globalization like abuse of workers’ rights, environmental 
degradation, privatization of health and other social services, 
increased poverty, loss of autonomy, and others, they also see 
their fundamental cultural and religious belief systems un-
der assault.9 The Tibetan view of “reality” and their attitude 
towards nature is different from the frontier mentality that 
drives globalization. Globalization is driven by an ideology 
of unlimited production and consumption (hence unlimited 
growth) that views nature as something to be exploited or 
conquered by mankind. This ideology that sees nature as 
existing separate from “man” is fundamentally counter to 
Tibetan (Buddhist) thinking which views humans as an inte-
gral part of nature or the environment in which they live. In 
fact, the Tibetan word for environment, Khoryug, is a recent-
ly coined term. In traditional Tibetan society there was never 
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a need for such a word. “Environment,” to Tibetans, was not 
something “out there” to be exploited, or saved: people were 
a part of the environment. These values are now at risk of be-
ing lost as globalization leads to accumulation of power not 
just in terms of capital but also in knowledge, amongst other 
forms.10 For example, globalization undermines the value of 
local diversity and offers legitimacy to the dominant liberal 
agenda.
William Greider describes globalization as a machine that 
“throws off enormous wealth and bounty while it also leaves 
behind great furrows of wreckage.”11 Most 
often, the people who reap the bountiful 
wealth are the already rich (and power-
ful), and the ones who are left behind 
to live in the wreckage are the common 
citizens, with the disenfranchised peo-
ples most adversely affected. Tibetans 
are such a people—a people who do not 
have say in the policies that sculpt their 
future. While free trade rules promise to 
bring technology and investments into 
their land, there are no mechanisms or 
provisions to protect them from exploi-
tation by powerful self-interested foreign 
investors, whether American, European, 
Japanese, or Chinese. Tibetan people’s 
concerns stem from the understand-
ing that globalization is a double edged 
sword and that they will be, to a large 
extent, on the losing side under present 
Chinese government policies.
SECTION II: TIBET UNDER CHINA’S TRANSITION 
TO A “MARKET ECONOMY”
China’s race to globalization
Unlike what the neoliberals say about globalization’s impacts 
on sovereignty, Chinese leaders see it in highly state-centric 
and state-empowering terms.12 Globalization, (quanqiuhua), 
it is safe to say, is China’s main long-term geo-economic 
and, by extension, geopolitical strategy for making China 
rich and strong.13 Beijing has made an uncodiﬁed deal with 
the Chinese people, a social contract, to deliver economic 
growth in return for the single party’s (Chinese Communist 
Party) unquestioned rule.14 
Behind People’s Republic of China’s “miraculous” econom-
ic growth since it opened it borders for international trade 
(late 1970s) lies a different, less-told reality. Although China 
has been undertaking a series of “reforms” and restructuring 
of its economic system to be more compatible with rapidly 
changing global markets and other forces of globalization, 
deep structural imperfections abound in China, hindering 
its transformation to an efﬁcient “market economy with 
Chinese characteristics.” Its banking system, for example, is 
considered one of Asia’s weakest and its legal system requires 
profound changes to become independent of the govern-
ment.15 Both the greed of Western businesses that see China 
as a vast consumer market for their products, and the fear 
of “Western Realists” who propagate the notion of a “China 
Threat,” are ill founded. Rising inequality, rampant corrup-
tion, soaring unemployment, over 100,000 inefﬁcient indus-
trial SOEs (state owned enterprises) that 
employ more than half its work force,16 
water scarcity and pollution (amongst 
the major environmental concerns), and 
bad loans are some of deeper systemic 
problems obscured by China’s quadru-
pled GDP (Gross Domestic Product).17 
Although it would be an exaggeration to 
say China is on the brink of a social rev-
olution, its leaders no doubt have a num-
ber of very serious problems to deal with 
more pressing than the misperceptions 
of Western businesses and Realists.
To ensure long-term “stability of 
the motherland” the Chinese leaders 
launched the Western Development 
Campaign in June 1999.18 Jiang Zemin 
explicitly said that the campaign “has 
major signiﬁcance for the future prosper-
ity of the country and the [Party’s] long 
reign and perennial stability.”19 Chinese 
strategists see the campaign as a means to reduce regional 
economic disparities and consolidate its control over Tibet 
and other politically sensitive and strategically important 
inner regions. The launch of this campaign can be seen as 
opportune in light of China’s WTO accession: China’s plan 
to ‘develop’ its west is an old one which heretofore could not 
be implemented mainly due to lack of capital and technol-
ogy. It now aims to do that in collaboration with Western 
businesses, or more accurately, by using their capital and 
technology. And Tibet is a key focus of the campaign.
The objectives of “developing” Tibet
Based on Chinese macro-economic statistics, there has 
been incredible economic growth in Tibet since the military 
invasion in 1949.20 Ofﬁcial statistics show Tibet Autonomous 
Region’s GDP growth averaging 12.8% per annum from 
1994-1995,21 with a rapidly expanding tertiary sector.22 
However, there are two key critical perspectives to these 
ﬁgures. One is the tradition of manufacturing favorable 
statistics by ofﬁcials trying to advance their careers— a 
common practice in Chinese bureaucratic politics.23 And the 
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second is the fact that a substantial part of TAR’s GDP ﬁgures 
are investments in large-scale infrastructure and ﬁxed assets, 
which are not based on local needs.24 What are really needed 
are investments in education and health services—TAR’s 
human development index (including life expectancy index 
and education index) is the poorest/lowest among China’s 
31 provinces.25 This is why there is a dichotomy between 
Chinese government’s rosy picture and the exiled Tibetans’ 
refutation that the beneﬁts of these “development” projects 
do not go to the Tibetans.26 
The main objective of “de-
veloping” Tibet is political. 
The most striking example of 
Chinese development projects 
inside Tibet is the recently 
completed Gormo-Lhasa rail-
way. This project is estimated 
to cost $3 billion, which, ac-
cording to the Washington-
based International Campaign 
for Tibet, “is more than double 
the combined total spent on 
education and healthcare by 
the Tibet Autonomous Region 
government in the last 50 
years.” Jiang Zemin, the then 
President of China, was re-
ported by the New York Times 
in August 2001 as saying of the 
Gormo-Lhasa railway, “Some 
people advised me not to go 
ahead with this project because 
it is not commercially viable. I 
said this is a political decision.” The Railway serves China’s 
political objective to develop Tibet—to assimilate Tibet and 
its people into the “Chinese motherland.” 
The Chinese government prefers to view development 
from a statist perspective, concerned with making the 
“motherland” strong and stable, even at the cost of basic con-
stitutional rights of “ethnic minorities.” The Tibetan people’s 
opposition comes from a nationalistic perspective, as they 
struggle under an oppressive regime, whose developmental 
policies are a death warrant to their national and cultural 
identity.
Beijing’s primary economic objective of investment in Ti-
bet is to exploit its rich natural resources. The Tibetan Pla-
teau—the geographical span of which (2.5 million square 
kilometers) roughly constitutes “ethnographic” Tibet—is 
rich in mineral resources.27 For example, just in the central 
and western areas of Tibet, Chinese experts have estimated 
mineral reserves worth US$ 81.3 billion, and the Chinese 
government is investing US$ 1.25 billion in prospecting and 
developing these resources.28 Among the more recent con-
cerns expressed by the exiled Tibetan government include 
the Chinese government’s increasing exploration and extrac-
tion of Tibet’s oil and natural gas reserves, and the construc-
tion of a railway line connecting Beijing to Lhasa.29 They 
have already started constructing pipelines to transport oil 
and natural gas to energy-thirsty East China in collaboration 
with Western companies.30 Almost all of these projects facili-
tate a supply of raw materials (and fuel) to meet the growing 
demands of China’s mammoth 
economy. Functionally, China 
uses Tibet as a resource ex-
traction colony.
The moral economy of Tibet
The dichotomy between the 
two positions is also due to the 
lifestyle and economic realities 
of Tibet. Tibetans are a “people 
who have developed a respect-
ful use of the natural resources 
and consequently a commit-
ment to creating and preserv-
ing a technology that interacts 
with local ecosystems in a sus-
tainable manner.”31 Even to-
day, more than three quarters 
of Tibetans are engaged in ag-
riculture, pastoralism, and no-
madic life.32 Tibet’s vast area, 
low density of population, aus-
tere technology, and Buddhist 
culture have resulted in a way 
of life that skillfully makes use of the few hands available, to 
maintain a high level of productivity, with sustainable use 
of the local resources. China has ignored these aspects of 
traditional Tibetan subsistence economy, and has imposed 
another economy on top, with “no roots and few linkages 
to the traditional economy. There is very little processing of 
Tibetan wool into garments, skins into shoes, milk to cheese 
suited to distant markets. Even the Lhasa beer factory relies 
on strains of barley developed by Chinese scientists rather 
than using traditional one.”33 The modern large-scale infra-
structural economy is overwhelmingly urban, concentrated 
in Chinese towns and cities and along the transport corri-
dors connecting them, and the beneﬁciaries are overwhelm-
ingly Chinese. 
With few linkages between the two economies, the rapidly 
growing modern economy impinges upon the livelihood of 
the majority of Tibetans. For example, Tibetan herders and 
nomads require vast open grasslands for their lifestyle. With 
increasing numbers of Chinese coming into Tibet, there are 
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more and more fences, and more and more regulations. Con-
sequently, they are encouraged to give up their traditional 
lifestyle and to settle at one place. Cooke and Marshall iden-
tiﬁed four negative economic and ecological consequences of 
such policies.34 These are: a) reduction in pastoralists’ claim 
to their land and its uses; b) increase in land degradation 
through overgrazing; c) opening former pastoral land for 
mining; and d) forcing former self-sufﬁcient nomads to be 
dependent on markets.35 These also mean loss of cultural 
and economic autonomy. To make these negative trends 
worse for the Tibetan people, globalization will give Chinese 
and foreign businesses “legal” tools in the form of free trade 
rules and WTO agreements that will efﬁciently marginalize 
Tibetans in their own land.
SECTION III: IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S WTO 
OBLIGATIONS FOR TIBET
Of the current WTO agreements, the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) could have the most direct impact on the 
Tibetans, as more than three quarters of them are engaged 
in the agricultural sector, most practicing pastoralism.36 AoA 
requires governments to reduce trade distortions (reduce 
tariffs and subsidies) and allow minimum market access. The 
dumping of cheap agricultural produce by the large foreign 
agribusinesses could shrink existing Tibetan markets. Until 
now such arguments have had little relevance because of the 
absence of transport infrastructure. But this fast developing 
sector, most notably the railway connecting Beijing to Lhasa, 
makes such outcomes possible. And the lifting of domestic 
subsidies could result in increased costs of production for 
Tibetan farmers. 
Another important WTO agreement with major implica-
tions for Tibet is Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs). 
One of the most controversial Uruguay Round Agreements, 
TRIPs “requires that WTO member countries protect non-
biological and microbiological processes for the production 
of plants and animals, meaning that plants and animals are 
patentable if they are cloned or genetically altered.”37 Com-
panies can patent the genetic make-up of the plant if they 
claim that they have “discovered” the gene structure.38 De-
pending on proﬁtability, it is conceivable that a ﬁrm could, 
for example, claim a patent for “Tsampa” (staple food of Ti-
betans made from barley). The patenting of “Basmati” rice 
by the Texas-based ﬁrm RiceTec is an example that justiﬁes 
concerns from indigenous people like Tibetans.39 Farmers in 
India and Pakistan have grown Basmati rice for generations, 
yet RiceTec was granted a patent for making a slight altera-
tion to it. 
The danger of appropriation of Tibetan intellectual prop-
erty is enormous, as Chinese scientists have been studying, 
analyzing, and labeling Tibet’s genetic diversity.40 What is 
very likely to happen is that companies will claim patents 
for the different plants and herbs endemic to Tibet, espe-
cially those that have been used by Tibetans for medicinal 
purposes for generations. Tibetans could lose opportunities 
to make proﬁts from their rich knowledge of the medicinal 
properties of various plants and other materials that they 
have developed through centuries of practice. Such a situ-
ation is also not without precedent. American and Japanese 
multinational companies have received patents on different 
products made from the neem tree, which the indigenous 
people of India have been using for hundreds of years.41 The 
lack of legal expertise and ﬁnance will leave Tibetans not 
just unable to get patents but also disadvantaged in availing 
themselves of other beneﬁts of the WTO, like its infamous 
dispute resolution provisions.=
CONCLUSION
The Chinese word for Tibet, Xizang, means the “western 
treasure house.” Despite China’s unrestrained attempts 
to take advantage of the “treasure house,” Tibet’s harsh 
geographical conditions and paucity of human labor, 
transport infrastructure, modern technology and capital 
have made it extremely challenging and expensive to exploit 
its resources proﬁtably. These conditions have kept most 
of Tibet economically isolated except for certain areas of 
northeast Amdo.43 Therefore, Tibet is one of the few places 
of the world today that is not integrated into the global 
economy. However, the trends in recent decades show that 
the Chinese government may now be successful in what it 
has always wanted to do—to put Tibet on the escalator to 
becoming a proﬁtable resource colony. 
This essay does not deny the development that China has 
brought into Tibet. It is possible to chat online or to “buzz” 
someone on a mobile phone in Tibet today. However, what 
goes on in the name of “development” in Tibet, as in many 
economically poorer countries in today’s world of globaliza-
tion, is a direct result of decisions imposed by foreigners, 
based on their economic and political interests. The absence 
of control over policies that sculpt their short and long-term 
prospects, or even forums for free discussion of government 
policies, is perhaps at the heart of Tibetan people’s opposi-
tion to the so-called development that is sweeping their land. 
Neither Chinese law nor free trade rules ensure Tibetans any 
rights to discuss and debate policies, or negotiate terms of 
agreements with foreign investors. 
To the Tibetans, globalization represents another frame-
work for exploitation, imposed upon them by China, without 
their approval or knowledge. This phenomenon will further 
constrict their opportunities for economic, cultural, and po-
litical development by compounding the severe inequalities 
of power and resources already in place. Globalization comes 
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to Tibet at Chinese invitation and under Chinese terms to 
fulﬁll Chinese goals. Tibetans in Tibet are forced to be silent 
witnesses as big Western companies like British Petroleum 
(BP) and Exxon invest on their land under “free trade” rules 
to do business with dummy corporations like PetroChina, 
which are created and run by the Chinese government to 
give a privately owned 
appearance for Western 
investors.44
The observations 
made in this paper have 
important policy impli-
cations for the Tibetan 
government-in-exile. 
Perhaps it should re-
assess its proposal for 
“genuine autonomy.” 
Under the framework of 
“genuine autonomy” that 
the exiled government 
has proposed to China 
(and later made non-
binding), Tibet’s foreign 
affairs and, by exten-
sion, the terms of inter-
national trade, would be 
under Chinese control. 
Such an arrangement would not address some of the broader 
concerns expressed here. Therefore, the view of this paper 
would support the request made by the Tibetan delegation 
at the Asia Paciﬁc People’s Assembly that their government 
“strengthen its position regarding negotiation with China 
and claim its legitimate right to fully control its foreign af-
fairs and to choose i[t]s economic model.”45
Further research recommendations
This essay provides explanations for the polarized Tibetan and 
Chinese positions on Tibet’s contemporary developmental 
discourse. To bridge the dichotomy between the Chinese 
government’s statist position and Tibetan nationalist concerns, 
or in other words to carry this developmental debate beyond 
traditional Tibet-China politics, scholars and leaders will do 
well to emphasize not just the pursuit of the national interest 
but also fulﬁllment of human development and security.46 
From the human security perspective, developmental 
discourse (and politics) must shift its emphasis (or rather 
overemphasis) from statist or nationalistic goals to meeting 
basic human needs, creating a condition of existence in 
which human dignity, including meaningful participation 
in the life of the community is realized. Instead of relying 
on economic statistics to measure development, the human 
development approach provides an alternative by stressing 
the quality of life, as measured by social statistics such as 
infant mortality, literacy, access to health care, etc.47 
One World, Ready or Not, warned William Grieder, and 
Tibetans are not ready to face this forthcoming challenge. 
Unfortunately, there are no programs that would educate 
Tibetan people about the new free trade rules and their im-
plications for their liveli-
hood. Work is needed 
to identify appropriate 
economic niches for 
Tibetans (particularly 
farmers and herders) in 
a more competitive “free 
market” environment; to 
provide them with train-
ing (in employable skills) 
and tools (e.g., small 
loans for investment in 
new income-generating 
activities); to identify 
foreign business oppor-
tunities for these people; 
to assess how Tibetans 
in Tibet view modern-
ization; and to identify 
their speciﬁc develop-
mental socio-economic 
concerns—short as well as long term. Efforts must also be 
made to ﬁll in the severe lack of data on all aspects of Tibet’s 
economy in order to plan for a future that provides for the 
needs of Tibetans. 
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